Michigan Law Review
Volume 101

Issue 1

2002

The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway: Do Tenants Have a
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common
Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?
Sean M. Lewis
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Sean M. Lewis, The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway: Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 273
(2002).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTE
The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway:
Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of
Their Apartment Buildings?

Sean M. Lewis
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 273
I. EXAMINING CIRCUIT CASE LAW ... ............................... ............ 277
.

A
B.

The Sixth Circuit Provides a Sound Starting Point ........ .. .. 278
The Majority Approach ls Unpersuasive and Should
Be Rejected....... ... .............. ...... ...... ....... ......... ............. . . . ... 280
1. The Second Circuit ............ .... .......................... .............. 280
2. The Seventh Circuit ......................................................... 284
3. The Eighth Circuit........................................................... 287
4. The Ninth Circuit.................... ........................ ....... ... ..... 291
..

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

II. BROADLY INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS
CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT .................. 292

A
B.

McDonald v. United States Should Govern the

Current Controversy ............................... ........ ... ................... 293
The Supreme Court's Commitment to Protecting
Privacy Near the Home................ ............................ . . .. 297
..

.

.

.

....

III. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE
AMENDMENT'S HISTORY AND THE FRAMERS' INTENTIONS .. 300

IV.

SOUND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LOCKED COMMON AREA
CONTEXT······················································································· 305

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 310
INTRODUCTION
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a
tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspi
cious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no vio
lence or threats of it.

- Justice Jackson1

1. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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One afternoon, a police officer spots a man driving a Cadillac
through a run·down neighborhood.2 His interest piqued, the officer
decides to follow the vehicle. The Cadillac soon comes to rest in front
of an apartment building, and the driver, Jimmy Barrios·Moriera, re·
moves a shopping bag from the trunk and enters the building. The
moment Barrios·Moriera disappears within the doorway, the officer
sprints after him because he knows that the door to the apartment
building will automatically lock when it closes. He manages to catch
the door just in time and rushes in. Barrios·Moriera is already halfway
up a flight of stairs in the common hallway and ignores the police offi·
cer when he identifies himself and indicates a desire to speak with him.
Barrios·Moriera continues up the stairs and sets his shopping bag on
the floor beside him as he hurriedly tries to open his door. The police
officer sprints up the stairs after him and arrives before Barrios·
Moriera can do so. He thrusts his hand into Barrios·Moriera's bag and
withdraws a rectangular·shaped object wrapped in tape. He then or·
ders Barrios·Moriera to go into his apartment, where he arrests him
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
If this story unfolded in the Second, Seventh, Eighth, or Ninth
Circuits, Barrios·Moriera would have no constitutional basis for com·
plaint.3 Each of these circuits refuses to recognize that a tenant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of
an apartment building for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.4 The
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, stands alone5 in maintaining that a
2. These facts are essentially those recounted by the court in United States

v.

Barrios

Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1989).

3. This story did, in fact, unfold in the Second Circuit, and Barrios-Moriera's constitu
tional claims were summarily rejected. Id. at 14-15.
4. See United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion,
942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977). "For purposes of the Fourth Amendment" is a
widely used expression in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
5. The First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the
precise question raised in this Note. Many circuits have, however, addressed the question of
whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in unlocked common areas within
an apartment complex. The First Circuit holds that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in unlocked common areas. See United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.
1998) ("It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant Jacks a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.") (citing United States v. Cruz
Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557-58 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding, in a case of first impression, that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when agents entered the apartment
building's garage without a warrant, because defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the garage)); United States v. Thomley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1983) {holding
that defendant, who was not a tenant of the searched apartment, had no Fourth Amendment
claim regarding the search of an unlocked shared storage area, because defendant had no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy). The Third Circuit interprets the Fourth
Amendment in this manner as well. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir.
1992) (holding that a tenant's zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment does not
extend to the unlocked, common hallways of apartment buildings) (citing Holland, 755 F.2d
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tenant does have a constitutionally protected right to privacy in such
areas.6 This circuit split first arose in 1976,7 and the issue remains very
much in dispute today.8 As the weight of precedent on each side of the
divide continues to grow, there is an increasing need for the Supreme
Court to resolve this important Fourth Amendment issue.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures.9 This protection of privacy embodied within the
Amendment is not limited to the home or other specified locales;10
rather, it is aimed at the protection of the individual.11 The Supreme
Court interprets this protection broadly, so that "[w]herever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreason253; United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 777 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding, without citing any
authority, that a stairwell is a public place, and holding that there can be no reasonable ex
pectation of privacy within such areas); United States v. Breland, 715 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.
1989) (holding that defendant's claim to a protected privacy interest in a basement storage
area was undermined by the unlocked door guarding the area)). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
does not interpret the Fourth Amendment to protect unlocked common areas. See United
States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an exterior breezeway of an apartment building that is "neither
enclosed nor locked"); United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), on the basis that the common area in
McDonald was both enclosed and locked while the exterior walkway in this case was avail
able to the general public). The D.C. Circuit has adopted this view as well. See United States
v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that "appellant's constitutionally
protected privacy interest began at the door to [his) room [in his boarding house) . . . rather
than at the door to the [unlocked common areas of the] entire rooming house"); Perkins v.
United States, 432 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (embracing the district court's holding that offi
cers' peaceable, yet warrantless, entry into the unlocked, relatively public, common hallways
of a row house in which the defendant rented a room did not violate defendant's privacy in
terests).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).
7. In 1976, the Sixth Circuit handed down Carriger, which held that a tenant has a rea
sonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment building. This
holding stood in conflict with the Second Circuit's holdings in United States v. Miguel, 340
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965) and United States v. Conti, 361F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1976). See also infra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The split immediately deepened with the Eighth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977) holding that a tenant
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment
building.
8. See United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming the Sixth
Circuit's original holding on this matter).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977). Contra United States v.
Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment are inapplicable to locked common hallways because they are not part
of the home).
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]heFourth Amendment pro
tects people, not places.").
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able searches and seizures."12 This protection of the person extends to
the guilty and the innocent alike,'3 but the question that remains is
precisely what degree of protection the Fourth Amendment affords.
The answer to this question is found by an application of what has
come to be known as the Katz test.14 Justice Harlan first articulated
this test in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,15 where he
stated, "there is a twofold requirement [for Fourth Amendment pro
tection], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that so
ciety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "16 In Katz, the Court
held that the FBI's use of an electronic listening device attached to the
outside of a telephone booth violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.17 In so holding, the Court abandoned the
traditional "trespass" doctrine upon which prior Fourth Amendment
questions had tumed.18
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted and refined Justice
Harlan's standard as the binding test in Fourth Amendment cases.19
Consequently, in every Fourth Amendment case, the Court first seeks
to determine whether a person had, or should have had, an actual

12. Id. at 359.
13. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
14. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) ("Since Katz . . the
touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a
'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' ").
.

15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 358-59.
18. Id. at 353 (abandoning the "trespass" doctrine). The trespass doctrine was based on
the premise that property interests controlled the Government's right to search and seize.
Under this doctrine, a physical invasion into a protected area was required before a Fourth
Amendment violation could be established See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928).
19. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) ("First, we ask whether the indi
vidual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has
shown that he sought to preserve something as private . . .. Second, we inquire whether the
individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reason
able.'') (internal citations and quotations omitted); Calif ornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitu
tionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' ") (citing Karz, 389 U.S. at 516 (Harlan
J., concurring)); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 743 (1979);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747-54 (1971).
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subjective expectation of privacy.20 The Court will then consider
whether that expectation was reasonable under the circumstances.21
This Note contends that the police practice of entering the locked
common areas of apartment buildings without permission or a warrant
violates the Constitution. Part I examines the conflicting approaches
adopted by the circuit courts in this area and argues that the approach
adopted by the majority of circuits is flawed.22 Part II argues that in
terpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants' privacy expecta
tions within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings is
most consistent with Supreme Court precedent in other Fourth
Amendment cases. Part III argues that this broad interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment is necessitated by the history of that Amendment
and by the intent of the Framers. Part IV argues that a consideration
of tenants' legitimate privacy interests, coupled with a respect for the
rule of law, demands that the Court extend the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to cover the locked common areas of multi-unit
apartment buildings. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court
should resolve this circuit split, which threatens the privacy and secu
rity of a large portion of the American population, by extending
Fourth Amendment protection in the locked common area context.
I.

EXAMINING CIRCUIT CA S E LA W

This Part critiques the conflicting approaches adopted b y the cir
cuit courts in the locked common area context and argues that the
Sixth Circuit's approach is superior to that adopted by the majority of
circuits. Section I.A argues that the Sixth Circuit's analysis represents
a well-reasoned approach to the issue and provides a solid starting
point for the Supreme Court's resolution of this Fourth Amendment
issue. Section LB argues that the Supreme Court should reject the po
sition adopted by the majority of circuits because it is lacking in per
suasive authority and meaningful analysis.

20. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43; id. at 741 n.5 (noting that a lack of actual subjec
tive expectation is not determinative of the case where one should have an expectation of
privacy in a certain area); id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("(W]hether privacy expecta
tions are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be
presumed to accept . . . but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open
society.").
21. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; White, 401 U.S. at 752 (determining whether the de
fendant's expectation was "justifiable," "reasonable," or "legitimate").
22. "A majority of circuits," as used in this Note, means a majority of the circuits that
have addressed the question examined by this Note (that is, the Second, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits).
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The Sixth Circuit Provides a Sound Starting Point

The Sixth Circuit's approach in locked common area cases estab
lishes a firm foundation for the Supreme Court's resolution of this im
portant constitutional issue. The Sixth Circuit takes a well-reasoned
approach in these cases, relying on Supreme Court precedent and
carefully considering the subjective expectations of tenants. In United
States v. Carriger,23 the Sixth Circuit first considered whether a gov
ernment agent's entry, without permission or a warrant, into the
locked common areas of an apartment building violated a tenant's
Fourth Amendment rights.24 In holding that such entry violated the
defendant's rights, the court took a number of factors into considera
tion. First, it noted that Katz expanded the scope of protection offered
by the Fourth Amendment.25 Second, it took great care to analyze the
facts and holding of United States v. McDonald26 and compare them to
the case at hand. In McDonald, the Supreme Court held that police
officers' warrantless entry into the locked common areas of a rooming
house violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.27 The Sixth
Circuit adopted Justice Jackson's explanation of the Court's holding
and concluded that, as the facts of McDonald and Carriger differed
only in degree but not in kind, McDonald should govern the contro
versy before the court.28 The Sixth Circuit noted that although gov
ernment entry in Carriger was effected through guile, whereas in
McDonald it was by force, this distinction in no way altered the ten
ant's subjective expectation of privacy and was therefore irrelevant to
the court's Fourth Amendment analysis.29 Finally, the court cited a
Louisiana Supreme Court case,30 a Fifth Circuit case,31 and two

23. 541F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976).
24. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 547 (holding "that because the officer did not have probable
cause to arrest appellant or his accomplice before he invaded an area where appellant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy [the Jocked common hallway of the apartment building],
the subsequent arrest and seizure of narcotics were invalid").
25. Id. at 549 (noting that the "Supreme Court's determination that the 'trespass' doc
trine could 'no longer be regarded as controlling' was intended to expand the protection af
forded by the Fourth Amendment").
26. 335 U.S. 451 (1948);see infra Section II.A (discussing McDonald).
27. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56.
28. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550.
29. Id. at 551.
30. State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) (recognizing a tenant's Fourth
Amendment "right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion" within the
hallways of his apartment building).
31. Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that "the backyard
area of Fixel 's [apartment) home is sufficiently removed and private in character that he
could reasonably expect privacy . . .. Thus ... [the officer's] actual invasion into this pro
tected area . ..violates theFourth Amendment") (internal citation omitted).
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Seventh Circuit cases32 that were closely on point, concluding that
these cases, taken together with Katz and McDonald, demanded a
holding in favor of the defendant.33 That is, the court held that a tenant
does have a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the
locked common areas of an apartment building, and an officer's entry
into these areas without permission or a warrant violates the Fourth
Amendment.34 The Sixth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed this holding,
stating that "any entry into a locked apartment building without per
mission, exigency or a warrant is prohibited [by the Fourth
Amendment]."35
The Sixth Circuit's treatment of this issue represents a well
reasoned approach to the question of whether tenants have a constitu
tionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of
their apartment buildings. Its jurisprudence in this area, however, is
but a starting point for the resolution of this important constitutional
question. A thorough evaluation of this issue should articulate why the
Sixth Circuit's approach is superior to that taken by the other four cir
cuits that have examined the locked common area question.36
Furthermore, a thorough evaluation must consider what role Supreme
Court precedent,37 the history of the Fourth Amendment and the in
tent of the Framers,38 and the demands of public policy should play in
this process.39

32. See United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding a constitution
ally protected expectation of privacy in the locked common hallway of a commercial build
ing); United States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding a constitutionally pro
tected expectation of privacy in the unlocked but closed basement of a commercial building);
see also infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
33. Carriger, 541F.2d at 552.
34. Id. at 550.
35. United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (delimiting Carriger by holding that there is no Fourth
Amendment violation where police gain entry to the locked common areas through the invi
tation of another tenant); United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the unlocked basement of his duplex,
due, in large part, to "[t]he nature of the living arrangement in a duplex, as opposed to a
multi-unit building . . ."). United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1994) (declining to ex
tend the recognized reasonable expectation of privacy to an apartment building's parking
lot). But see United States v. Smith, 941 F.2d 1210, 1991 WL 158699, at *7 (6th Cir. 1991)
(unpublished) ("Although this Court has recognized the principfo that tenants of an apart
ment building have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building
not open to the general public, the law is not well settled in this area.") (internal citations
omitted).
36. See infra Section l.B.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part Ill.
39. See infra Part IV.
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The Majority Approach Is Unpersuasive and Should Be Rejected

This Section criticizes the methodologies and holdings of the ma
jority of circuits in locked common area cases and concludes that the
Supreme Court should not adopt the position taken by these courts.
The majority position is embodied within a long line of cases that
stand for the proposition that a tenant has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment building.40
Quantity of cases alone, however, is not enough to establish sound le
gal precedent, and all of these cases can be traced back to courts' un
supported conclusions or citation to inapposite cases.41 The analysis in
these cases does not reflect an effort to establish a consistent test to
measure the extent and type of privacy expectations possessed by ten
ants,42 and a meaningful application of the two-part Katz test is
strangely absent.43 Moreover, with two puzzling exceptions,44 the ma
jority of circuits entirely ignore McDonald. Each circuit's faulty analy
sis will be examined in turn.
1.

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit's analysis fails for three reasons. First, the
court relies upon unsupported conclusions and citation to inapposite
cases. Second, the court fails to apply the Katz test meaningfully in
locked common area cases. Third, the court overlooks the fact that the
Fourth Amendment's protections are not limited to the home.
The Second Circuit first considered whether a tenant has a reason
able expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of his

40. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985) (listing cases).
The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have been grouped into a majority, not
only because each refuses to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in locked com
mon areas, but also because the reasoning and analysis of each bear striking similarities to
the others. See infra notes 45-136 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 45-136 and accompanying text.
42. But see Holland, 755 F.2d at 256 (bolstering its conclusion by noting that the defen
dant did not have an absolute right to exclude others); United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19,
25 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the officers' entry was peaceful); United States v. Conti, 361
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (same).
43. Contra United States v. Mccaster, 193 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining, after
careful consideration, that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy). As
pointed out infra note 124 and accompanying text, this is an anomaly in the majority's juris
prudence.
44. The first exception arises in United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965).
See infra note 48. The second exception arises in United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 n.2
(8th Cir. 1977) (citing McDonald to support the proposition that "an expectation of privacy
would ordinarily cover conversations that took place insicle . [the defendant's] apart
ment"). It is not at all clear why the Eighth Circuit cited McDonald for this purpose, as
McDonald had nothing to do with conversations within an apartment. See infra Section II.A.
.

.
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apartment building in United States v. Miguel.45 The court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment's protections that ensure the security and
privacy of a tenant within his apartment do not extend to the lobby of
an apartment building that is guarded by a door usually kept locked.46
The court cited no authority for this conclusion.47 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit has relied upon this unsupported conclusion as the ba
sis for much of its subsequent jurisprudence in this area.48
Although the genesis of the Second Circuit's case law in the com
mon area context preceded Katz,49 neither the Supreme Court's decla
ration that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"50 nor
the two-part Katz test51 affected the Second Circuit's approach to this
issue after Katz.52 Instead, the court continued to rely on its holding in
Miguel.53 Moreover, Katz entirely escaped the Second Circuit's notice

45. 340 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965).
46. Miguel, 340 F.2d at 814 (rejecting the defendant's contention that his arrest in the
lobby of his apartment building was illegal because the lobby was within the "curtilage" of
his residence).
47. Id. The entirety of the court's reasoning is as follows: "We have been cited to no
authority which would include the lobby of a multi-tenanted apartment house within the
'curtilage' of each tenant. Such authority as there is points the other way." Id. The court did
not mention what authority this might have been; instead, it summarily dismissed the defen
dant's claim. See id.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protection accorded to an apartment dweller's home does not extend to
an area just inside a hallway door that was meant to lock but did not). The court relied solely
on Miguel to conclude that "a lobby of an apartment house, guarded by a door usually kept
locked . . . is not a protected area within which the individual tenants have Fourth Amend
ment rights." Conti, 361 F.2d at 157. The Court also distinguished the case from McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), on the basis that the police officers' entry in the case at
bar was peaceable, and it cited United States v. Buchner, 164 F. Supp. 836 (D.D.C. 1958),
affd per curiam, 268 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and United States v. St. Clair, 240 F. Supp.
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), to support the proposition that "a technical trespass" will not defeat an
otherwise permissible search. Conti, 361 F.2d at 157. See also i1J.fra notes 163-164 and accom
panying text (arguing that a distinction on this basis is improper); infra Section II.A (dis
cussing McDonald).
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ).
"

52. The Second Circuit's first failure to address Katz came in United States v. Soyka, 394
F.2d 443, 450 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding entry by federal officers into an unlocked apart
ment building citing). The Court did not even mention Katz and declined, in a footnote and
without explanation, to reconsider its holdings in Miguel and Conti. Id. The Second Circuit
again failed to address Katz in United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 941 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971)
(dismissing the defendant's contention that government agents violated his Fourth Amend
ment rights when they entered an unlocked apartment building, walked along a common
vestibule, and positioned themselves outside the defendant's apartment door, citing only to
Miguel, Conti, and Soyka).
53. See supra notes 48, 52.
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in common area cases until 1979, where in United States v. Penco,54 the
court summarily dispensed with Katz by stating, "The argument that
the privacy expectations analysis of Katz v. United States somehow
undercut the reasoning of Miguel and [United States v.] Conti was ex
pressly considered and rejected by our Court in United States v.
Llanes."55

An examination of United States v. L lanes,56 however, proves oth
erwise. In that case, the defendant relied on Katz to contend that a
government agent, in stationing himself in the unlocked hallway of the
defendant's apartment building and eavesdropping on his conversa
tions, violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.57 His conten
tion was, in essence, that overheard conversations are constitutionally
protected and therefore inadmissible as evidence.58 The court rejected
the argument that Katz forbids official eavesdropping altogether and
invoked the Katz qualification, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."59 The court concluded that conversations
carried on in a manner that makes them accessible to an individual
standing outside a person's apartment are conversations "knowingly
exposed to the public."00 The assumption implicit in this conclusion is
that the unlocked hallway in this case was a public place in which the
police officer had a right to be.
The Penco court was incorrect in stating that Llanes resolved the
question of whether the Katz privacy expectation analysis undercut
the Second Circuit's reasoning in Miguel and Conti.61 The question the
L lanes court implicitly considered was whether an unlocked hallway in
an apartment building was a public place.62 The court assumed that it
was, but it did not consider whether a tenant's expectation of privacy
54. 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979) (relying on Miguel, Conti, and Wilkes to support the con
clusion that government agents did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
by, inter alia, stationing themselves in the locked common hallway outside the defendant's
doorway, because their illegal entry was made in a peaceful manner).
55. Penco, 612 F.2d at 25 (internal citations omitted).
56. 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968).
57. Llanes, 398 F.2d at 883-84.
58. Id. at 884.
59. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (alternation in original).
60. Id.
61. See United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1979).
62. Llanes, 398 F.2d at 884; see also United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir.
1970) (distinguishing Llanes on the grounds that the door to the common area in the case at
bar was locked, hence the hallway in question was not a public area); Commonwealth v.
Hall, 323 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Mass. 1975) (holding "that where a common area in an apartment
building is not locked off, so that anyone can enter it, a tenant cannot complain if a police
man stationing himself there overhears a conversation in the apartment") (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the issue at
bar in both pre-Katz cases, met the two-part test set forth in Katz.63
The Penco court failed to distinguish locked common areas from un
locked common areas and, instead, assumed that a locked door was
irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis.64 Such an assumption is
unjustified. In a Katz analysis, the distinction between a locked com
mon area and an unlocked common area can play an important role in
establishing both a subjective expectation of privacy and the reason
ableness of that expectation.65 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's reli
ance on Llanes to distinguish Katz in the locked common area context
is misplaced.
The Second Circuit unequivocally reaffirmed its position on the
locked common area question in United States v. Holland.66 The court
stated, "[I]t is the established law of this Circuit that the common halls
and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual ten
ant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors."67
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed great weight on the fact
that the Supreme Court has not recognized common hallways as part
of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.68
Even if the Second Circuit is correct in asserting a common hall
way is not part of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,69
the court's subsequent conclusion that hallways are automatically out-

63. See Llanes, 398 F.2d at 884.
64. See Penco, 612 F.2d at 25.
65. See, e.g., Case, 435 F.2d at 768-69; see also supra note 62.
66. 755 F.2d 253, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the defendant's contention that his
warrantless arrest, effected in the Jocked common hallway of his apartment building, took
place within his home and was therefore unconstitutional); see also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to exe
cute a routine felony arrest).
67. Holland, 755 F.2d at 255. The Second Circuit cited the following cases in support of
this proposition: United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding, without citing authority or offering an explanation, that the common hallways out
side the defendant's apartment were public places); United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985,
991 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the defendant "had no legitimate expectation of privacy with
respect to an object which he threw outside the apartment (onto an exterior fire escape] with
the object of getting rid of it"); Penco, 612 F.2d at 24-25; United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d
111, 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (noticing, but not reaching, the issue of whether the defendant's ar
rest "on the landing outside his actual apartment although inside the house owned by his
stepbrother's father" was within his "home" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 941 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Llanes, 398 F.Zd at 883-84;
United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966); and United States v. Miguel, 340
F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965).
68. Holland, 755 F.2d at 255.
69. This Note does not address this particular issue because it is irrelevant to the argu
ment advanced. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
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side the zone of privacy70 protected by the Fourth Amendment is not
justified. The Supreme Court has categorically rejected the notion that
the Fourth Amendment protects only the home or other limited
locales.71 Instead, the Court has broadly stated, "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."72 In light of this principle, a
consideration of tenants' privacy interests within locked common ar
eas deserves more careful scrutiny under the Katz test.
The Holland court neglected meaningfully to apply the Katz test
and, instead, based its reasoning upon an unduly narrow view of the
Fourth Amendment that the Supreme Court here rejected in Katz and
other cases.73 The court reached its conclusion by relying on cases that
either are not on point or lack persuasive authority.74 The Second
Circuit continues to adhere to the position it adopted in Holland,
paying lip service to Katz while summarily dismissing any claim to pri
vacy.75
2.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit has fared no better in the locked common
area context because it relies on inapposite cases and the faulty analy
sis of the Second and Eighth Circuits.76 In United States v.

70. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 361 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
Fourth Amendment was designed ... to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protec
tions could be breached only where the 'reasonable' requirements of the probable-cause
standard were met.").
71. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (rejecting the Government's ar
gument that "the Warrant Clause was . . . intended to guard only against intrusions into the
home"); see also Calif ornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 587-88 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The Government's principal contention was that 'the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause
protects only interests traditionally identified with the home.' We categorically rejected that
contention, relying on the history and text of the Amendment, the policy underlying the
warrant requirement, and a line of cases spanning over a century of our jurisprudence.'').
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
73.

See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

74.

See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing these Second Circuit cases).

75. See United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the
defendant's Fourth Amendment claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the locked
common hallway of his apartment building) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Martinez
Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text
(discussing Holland); supra note 67 (discussing Martinez-Gonzalez). It is not at all clear why
the court cited Santana, as that case considered whether an officer's warrantless entry into a
house while in "hot pursuit" of a suspect violated the Fourth Amendment and does not
stand for the proposition that tenants have no expectation of privacy in common hallways,
locked or otherwise. See Santana, 427 U.S. 38; infra note 108; see also United States v.
Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976).
76. See
proach).

infra

notes 97-125 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit's ap

October 2002]

Fourth Amendment

285

Concepcion,77 the court's sole case addressing the precise question of
whether a tenant has a constitutionally protected privacy interest
within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the court
held that a tenant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
these areas.78 The court stated that it was odd to think of an expecta
tion of privacy in an entryway, and this view, coupled with the defen
dant's inability to exclude absolutely all others from the common
areas, led the court to conclude that no Fourth Amendment protection
attaches in these types of situations.79 The court justified its holding
with citations to two Seventh Circuit cases80 and a combination of
Second,81 Fifth,82 and Eighth Circuit83 cases.
Although on its face the Seventh Circuit seems to marshal a fair
amount of support for its conclusion, a brief examination of the cases
·

77. 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991).
78. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (addressing whether police entry into the locked com
mon area of the defendant's apartment building was an unreasonable search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
79. The court provided the following analysis:
Concepcion could not assert an expectation of 'privacy' in the common area . . . because the
other five tenants sharing the same entrance used the space and could admit as many guests
as they pleased; Concepcion had no expectation that goings-on in the common areas would
remain his secret. Indeed, it is odd to think of an expectation of 'privacy' in the entrances to
a building . . . . The area outside one's door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside.
We think the district court on solid ground in holding that a tenant has no reasonable expec
tation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.

Id.
80. The Concepcion court first cites to United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 69 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1980). In Acevedo, the court relied upon United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.
1979), and United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), to dismiss the defendant's
claim to Fourth Amendment protection in an unlocked gangway between his apartment and
an adjacent tavern. While Shima is on point as to whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an exterior walkway open and available to the general public, it is
inapposite to those areas that are enclosed or locked (such as those at issue in Concepcion).
See supra note 5 (discussing the law of unlocked common areas). Penco and the cases on
which it relies trace their intellectual and legal origin to blind assumptions and unsupported
conclusions. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Penco and its origins). The
second case that the Concepcion court relies upon is United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983,
990 (7th Cir. 1987). Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172. The Boden court declined to recognize an
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a walk-in storage unit facility. Boden, 854
F.2d at 990. The court accorded great weight to the fact that the defendant lacked an abso
lute subjective expectation of privacy and analogized to the common areas of a locked
apartment building before concluding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. It cited Acevedo as its only authority on this ground. Id.
81. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1985), and United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also supra note 54 and
accompanying text (discussing Holland and Penco).
82. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Shima, 560 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.
1977)); see also supra notes 5, 80 (discussing Shima).
83. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir.
1977)); see also infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text (discussing Eisler).
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cited reveals the court's authority as nothing more than a paper tiger.84
For example, the Seventh Circuit cited a Fifth Circuit case, United
States v. Shima,85 in support of the proposition that there is no consti
tutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas
of an apartment building.86 The Seventh Circuit's reliance on Shima,
however, was misplaced. The question in that case was whether a per
son had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an exterior walkway
open and available to the general public; the court did not consider
whether such an expectation exists in areas that are enclosed or
locked.87
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit avoided any meaningful analysis
of two of its past cases whose holdings weighed against the court's
newly adopted position. In United States v. Case,88 the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the defendants had a right to privacy in a locked
common hallway used by only a small number of people. The court
found that because the hallway was not a public place, the defendants'
privacy interests enjoyed constitutional protection.89 The Case court
distinguished L lanes90 on the basis that, while the unlocked hallway in
Llanes may have been a "public place," the locked hallway in the case
at bar was not.91 Consequently, the court held that the officers' war
rantless entry into the locked common area violated the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights.92 In United States v. Rosenberg,93 the court

84. Shima simply is not on point. See supra notes 5, 80; infra note 108. Boden relies
solely upon Acevedo. See supra note 80. Acevedo's only source of authority that supports the
breath of its holding is Penco. See supra note 80. The flaws in both Penco and Holland were
discussed above. See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text. The flaws in Eisler are dis
cussed at length infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text.
85. 560 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. See
Cir. 1977)).
87.

Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172

(citing United States v. Shima, 560 F.2d 1287 (5th

See supra notes 5, 80.

88. 435 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1970).
89.

Case, 435 F.2d at 768.

90. United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968); see also supra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text (discussing Llanes).
91. The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows:

Llanes, however, is based upon the finding that the hallway was a public place and

that the
defendants could hardly expect conversations audible to someone in a public place to be re
garded as private. On the contrary, the district judge in this case found that the hallway 'was
not such a public area as to entitle the Court to consider it a non-protected area' and we
concur. The hallway was kept locked ....The hallway was used by a very confined group,
and, most of the time, limited to the proprietors of the stores in the building.

Case, 435 F.2d at 768-69 (internal citation omitted).
92. Id. at 767-68 (holding fo r the defendant notwithstanding the fact that police officers
had obtained a key from the landlord).
93. 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969).
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held that government officials' warrantless entry into the unlocked,
but closed, basement of a commercial building violated the Fourth
Amendment.94
The court disposed of these cases by stating, without any explana
tion or justification: "To the extent that United States v. Rosenberg and
United States v. Case imply otherwise, they have not survived changes
in the Supreme Court's definition of protected privacy interests."95 It is
not at all clear why the court asserts that these two cases have not sur
vived changes in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and there is little
indication that either case has been overruled.96
3.

The Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit independently developed its own line of cases
in the locked common area context. Its analysis in this area, however,
proves little better than that of the circuits discussed above because it
relies on the mistaken premise that an absolute right to exclude is nec
essary to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. In its seminal
case, United States v. Eisler,97 the Eighth Circuit rejected the defen
dant's contention that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment
rights when they entered the locked common hallway of his apartment
building and eavesdropped outside his door.98 The court invoked the
Katz test, but it concluded that the defendant had no legitimate expec
tation of privacy within the locked common areas of his apartment
building because those areas were open to use by other tenants, their
guests, the landlord, and other authorized individuals.99 The court re
fused to recognize the defendant's limited privacy interests in these
areas as meriting constitutional protection, stating, "An expectation of
privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any
intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."100 The court offered no

94. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d at 682-83 (rejecting the government's argument "that the com
mercial nature of the building constituted an implied invitation to enter" and holding that
the government agents' entry was unlawful).
95. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
96. While the portion of the court's holding in Case regarding the landlord's grant of
permission to enter the premises may no longer be accurate in light of United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), this in no way overrules the court's holding that the
locked hallway was a protected area.
97. 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977).
98.

Eisler, 567 F.2d at 815-16.

99.

Id. at 816.

100.

Id. (alternation in original).
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support for the proposition that an absolute right to exclude is neces
sary to establish a protected expectation of privacy.101
The fact that tenants do not have an absolute right to exclude all
others from the locked common areas of their buildings should not
obliterate their constitutional interests in these areas. Numerous
Supreme Court decisions102 affirm the maxim that "[p]rivacy is not a
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all."103 Rather, the
scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment is colored in
shades of gray. So long as an individual has some expectation of pri
vacy, the Court has held that, with few exceptions,104 the government
may not tread there without prior approval by a neutral magistrate.105
This principle applies with equal force to the locked common areas of
apartment buildings. While tenants cannot expect to be free from ob
servation by other tenants and their guests, they do expect to be free
from the prying senses of trespassers and uninvited strangers.106
While the Supreme Court has been unwilling to find a Fourth
Amendment violation where government agents make an observation
from an area where anyone has a right to be,107 it has continued to rec101. Id.; see also United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the right to exclude must be absolute to merit any Fourth Amendment protection); United
States v. Boden, 854 F. 2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d
253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
102. Consider the Court's reasoning in Bond v.

United States:

[A] law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage
violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches . . . . When a
bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus em
ployees may move it for one reason or another ... . [But.] he does not expect that other pas
sengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.
But this is exactly what the agent did here.
529 U.S. 334, 335, 338-39 (2000); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-15
(1978) (holding that while an employer's privacy interest was not absolute, it was neverthe
less protected by the Fourth Amendment).
103. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (list
ing exceptions to the warrant requirement); United States v Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.l
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (listing exceptions based on "special law enfo rcement
needs").
105. See, e.g., Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39; Camara v Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533-34
(1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
106. See, e.g., McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring); State v. Di Bartolo,
276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) ("The fact that the location where the arrest took place was a
hallway, not an integral part of the apartment which the defendant was visiting, does not vi
tiate the defendant's right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion.").
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly ex
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that police observation
of a greenhouse from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); Califo rnia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that police observa
tion of a backyard from an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 fe et did not violate the de
fendant's reasonable expectation of privacy). In these cases, the Court reasoned that since
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ognize a constitutionally protected interest in those areas where indi
viduals have a right to exclude at least some people.108 In O 'Connor v.
Ortega,109 for example, the Court held that a government employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, even though "it is
the nature of government offices that others - such as fellow employ
ees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public - may
have frequent access to an individual's office."110 Again in Chapman v.
United States,1 1 1 the Court held that government agents' search of a
rented house violated the tenant's Fourth Amendment rights even
though the landlord had authority to enter the house for some pur
poses.112 As Justice Scalia insightfully pointed out, the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy, not solitude.113 While landlords and ten
ants may invite police officers into the locked common areas of their
buildings without infringing on other tenants' reasonable expectation
of privacy, this fact should not justify unauthorized, warrantless gov
ernment intrusion into areas from which the public is excluded.114 The
any member of the public could have lawfully observed the defendants' properties by flying
overhead, the defendants' expectations of privacy were not ones that society was prepared to
recognize as reasonable. The questions in those cases differ in one material respect from the
question presented by the controversy under discussion here. Those cases were decided on
the basis that "any member of the public" had a right to be in the airspace above the defen
dants' property and could have seen what the officers saw. The locked common areas of
apartment buildings, on the other hand, are not open to "any member of the public;" rather,
they are exclusive in nature and have been reasonably secured against unauthorized entry.
108. Some circuit courts claim that United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), holds
that the hallways of apartment buildings are public places. See, e.g., United States v.
Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Santana as supporting the proposition
that "[t]he hallway of an apartment building, as with the threshold of one's dwelling, is a
'public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amendment"). Contrary to this claim,
Santana did not hold that the hallway of an apartment building is a public place and there
fore outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Santana concerned "hot pursuit," and
the Court held that a suspect could not defeat an arrest commenced in a public place - the
threshold of the defendant's house - by retreating within. It made no statement about hall
ways, locked or otherwise. The leap from a threshold to interior hallways is unwarranted,
especially when one considers the f actors that led the Court to conclude that the threshold is
a public place. A threshold, where a person is "not merely visible to the public but [is] ex
posed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if . . . standing completely outside her
house," Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, is materially different than an interior hallway of an apart
ment complex, especially a locked hallway. There, a tenant is not even visible to the public,
let alone exposed to public speech, hearing, or touch.
109. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
110.

O 'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).

111. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
112.

Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616-17.

113.

O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring).

114. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), is probative here. In that case the
Court held that a congressional act authorizing government agents to search places of
employment for safety violations without first obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 315. The Court stated "[t]hat an employee is free to report, and the
Government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with OSHA that the employee

290

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:273

locked common areas of apartment buildings are not open to "any
member of the public;" rather they are exclusive in nature and merit
recognition by society as an area in which a tenant has a legitimate, al
though limited, expectation of privacy.115 This is especially true given
the fact that these locked areas are in close proximity to tenants'
homes.116
Contrary to what some courts suggest, there is not a parallel line of
Supreme Court precedent standing for the proposition that an expec
tation of privacy is violated only if the place is one that the defendant
has the right to keep subject to his exclusive control.117 In Rakas v.
lllinois,118 the Supreme Court pointed to the passengers' inability to
exclude others as one of many factors that established that the defen
dants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an automo
bile in which they had neither a property nor possessory interest.119
The Court did not state that an absolute right to exclude is necessary
to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy; rather, it pointed 'to
the defendants' complete inability to exclude.120 Moreover, the Court
highlighted the fact that the defendants "made no showing that they
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or
the area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passen
gers."121 Tenants in an apartment building are in a materially different
position than the passengers in Rakas. They do have the right to ex
clude those who have not been invited in by other tenants or the
landlord, and they do have an interest in the privacy and security of

observes furnishes no justification f or federal agents to enter a place of business from which
the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search." Id.
1 15.
senting).

See

Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., dis

1 1 6. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (declining to rec
ognize a privacy interest in an industrial area in part because "this is not an area immediately
adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened"); Calif ornia v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that privacy expectations are most heightened in
those areas intimately linked to the home); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the word
ing of the Fourth Amendment is directed.").
1 1 7. See United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978)).
118. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1 1 9. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (holding that passengers in a vehicle, who had neither a
property nor a possessory interest in the vehicle, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the glove compartment and the area under the seat).
120. Id. at 149; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding that the
defendant's complete inability to exclude was a factor undermining his claim to an expecta
tion of privacy in the purse of a third party into which he had dumped thousands of dollars
worth of illegal drugs).
121.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
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their apartment buildings.122 Consequently, tenants' incomplete right
to exclude is no reason for courts to deny their constitutional claims.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed Eisler,123 and al
though the court has recently shown a willingness to apply the Katz
test meaningfully in locked common area cases,124 the court's holding
in Eisler remains good law.125 As that holding is based upon a mistaken
premise, namely that an absolute right to exclude is a necessary pre
requisite for Fourth Amendment protection, it should be rejected.
4.

The Ninth Circuit

Finally, the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the locked common areas
question is also unsatisfactory. In United States v. Nohara,126 the court
refused to recognize a defendant's privacy interest in the locked hall
way outside his apartment. In refusing to recognize this interest, the
court relied upon dicta from one of its earlier cases,127 cited an inappo
site case,128 and relied upon the faulty reasoning of the Second129 and

122 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring);
State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Goldoff, 510 N.E.2d
277, 280 {Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
123. See United States v.Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1980) {declining, without ex
planation, to reverse its holding in Eisler ; see also United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632,
634 (8th Cir. 1984) (reaffirming the court's position that there is no expectation of privacy in
the hallways of an apartment building) (citing United States v.Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 {2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Eisler, 567
F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)).

)

124. See United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (examining whether a
tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas shared only by
the duplex's tenants and the landlord). The court invoked the Katz test and disposed of the
case after it determined that the defendant had no sul;>jective expectation of privacy on the
particular set of facts presented in this case. Id. at 933. In evaluating the defendant's claim,
the court looked to several factors: "whether the party has a possessory interest in the things
seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether
the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the
premises." Id. The court concluded that the defendant had no subjective expectation of pri
vacy in this case because he disavowed any possessory interests in the material, had not tried
to exclude anyone, and had taken no steps to maintain privacy in that area.Id.
125. See, e.g., United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 745 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v.Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir.1977), as valid law).
126. 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1241 ("The hallway of an apartment building, as with the thresh
old of one's dwelling, is a 'public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amend
ment.") (quoting dictum from United States v.Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1976));
see also supra note 108 (criticizing Calhoun .

)

128.

Id. at 1242 (citing United States
also supra note 5 (discussing Cruz Pagan) .

v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976));

129. Id. (citing United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1989));
discussion supra notes 2, 3, 75 (discussing Barrios-Moriera .

)

see

see also
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Eighth Circuits.130 The court noted the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Carriger131 but summarily rejected it.132 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
joined the Eighth in stating that an absolute right to exclude is a pre
condition for a constitutionally recognizable expectation of privacy.133
In addition to the problems noted above, the Ninth Circuit also
failed adequately to address United States v. Fluker,134 an earlier Ninth
Circuit case holding that a tenant had a reasonable expectation of pri
vacy in the locked hallway outside his apartment.135 The court brushed
that case aside by noting that Fluker was limited to its facts. The court
also pointed out that the apartment in Fluker was only one of two
basement apartments, not an apartment in a multi-unit complex.136
The court did not, however, discuss why the distinction between the
two types of common areas should make a difference for constitu
tional purposes, nor did it explain why the absence of an absolute right
to exclude was not determinative in Fluker, whereas the same condi
tion barred the defendant's claim in the case at bar.
II.

BROADLY INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS
CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question of
whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the
locked common areas of an apartment complex. This Part argues,
however, that a fair reading of relevant Supreme Court precedent de
mands that the provisions of the Fourth Amendment be interpreted to
protect tenants' expectations of privacy within these areas. Section
II.A argues that Justice Jackson's concurrence in McDonald should
govern the current controversy. Section 11.B argues that the Supreme
Court's commitment to protecting privacy interests in and around the
home calls for an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that pro-

130. Id. (citing United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1984), United
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)); see also supra notes 97-125 and accompanying
text (discussing McGrane and Eisler).
131. United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976);
and accompanying text {discussing Carriger).
132.

see also supra notes

23-34

Noham, 3 F.3d at 1242.

133. Id. (citing United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977), as its exclusive
authority on this point).
134. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
135. Fluker, 543 F.2d at 716 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy because "the
entry way was one to which access was clearly limited as a matter of right to the occupants of
the two basement apartments, and it is undisputed that the outer doorway was always locked
and that only the occupants of the two apartments and the landlord had keys thereto").
136. Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242 (declining to extend
ited that case to its fa cts).

Fluker because

the

Fluker Court

lim
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tects tenants from unauthorized, warrantless searches by government
agents in locked common areas.
A. McDonald v. United States Should

Govern the Current

Controversy

The best reading of McDonald137 reveals that a tenant does have a
constitutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common
areas of his apartment building. At issue in that case was whether
police officers violated the defendant's right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure when they entered the locked com
mon area of his rooming house without a search warrant.138 Police
officers peered into the defendant's room from the locked common
areas of the rooming house, which they entered by prying open a
window.139 The officers arrested the defendant and searched his room
after observing, from their position within the hallway, the defendant
engaged in illegal activity within his room.140 The Court found for the
defendant, stating, "Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police."141 As the police claimed no emergency in this case, the Court
concluded that faithful adherence to constitutional principles would
not tolerate the absence of a search warrant.142
There are three possible interpretations of the Court's holding in
this case.143 First, McDonald can be seen as a condemnation of the of
ficers' presence in the locked common area as a violation of the de
fendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Second, looking only to
the language of the Court's opinion, McDonald can be seen as merely
condemning the government's failure to secure a warrant given the
circumstances of the case.144 Finally, McDonald can be seen as a con
demnation of the officers' violent entry into a locked building.145
137. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
1 38.

Id. at 453.

139.

Id.; id. at 457-58, 460-61 (Jackson, J., concurring).

140.

Id.

141.

Id. at 455

142.

Id. at 456.

(Douglas, J., for the Court).

143. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.l(b) (3d ed. 2000)
("[A] majority of the Court never responded specifically to the government's argument that
McDonald could not complain of the police intrusion into his landlady's portion of the
premises . . . . ").
144. The following passage is illustrative:
We will not assume that where a defendant has been under surveillance for months, no
search warrant could have been obtained . . . . Moreover, when we move to the scene of the
crime, the reason for the absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers
heard the adding machine and, at the latest, when they saw what was transpiring in the
room, they certainly had adequate grounds for seeking a search warrant.
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Justice Jackson explained the Court's holding in this first manner
in his concurring opinion.146 His opinion constitutes the best reading of
this case because it explains the Court's holding in a way that makes it
both internally consistent and harmonious with the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Consequently, the Supreme Court
should recognize Justice Jackson's concurrence as authoritative and
should recognize a tenant's expectation of privacy within the locked
common areas of an apartment building as legitimate.
Justice Jackson saw the case before the Court as raising the issue
of whether police officers violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy and security when they entered the
locked hallway from which they observed the defendant's illegal ac
tivity.147 He concluded that "each tenant of a building, while he has no
right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter lawfully,
does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the in
tegrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking
and entry."148 Justice Jackson explained that a tenant's constitutionally
protected interests should not vanish merely because the unlawful
breaking and entering comes at the hands of government agents.149
This rationale applies with equal force in the setting of the locked
common areas of apartment buildings. The only difference between
the facts presented in McDonald and the controversy under discussion
here is that one setting was a rooming house while the other is an
apartment building.150 As such, courts should recognize tenants' expec
tations of privacy within the locked common areas of their apartment
buildings.
An alternative reading of McDonald views that case as merely
condemning the government agents' failure to secure a warrant where
it was practical for them to do so. This reading is unsatisfactory, how
ever, because it does not comport with the Supreme Court's holdings
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454-55.
145. See, e.g.,
McDonald on the

United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (distinguishing
basis that the police officers' entry in that case was violent, whereas the
entry in the case at bar was peaceful).
146.

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring).

147. Id. at 458-59 (Jackson, J., concurring) (focusing on the defendant's privacy interests
in the hallway and not solely within the four corners of his room).
148. Id. at 458; see also id. at 459 (noting that the police "were guilty of breaking and
entering - a felony in law and a crime far more serious than the one they were engaged in
suppressing").
149.

See id. at 458-59.

150. See infra Section 11.B (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is violated regardless of
whether police officers conduct a search or seizure within the locked common area of an
apartment building, as in United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1989), or
eavesdrop on conversations taking place within an apartment, as in United States v. Eisler,
567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)).

October 2002)

Fourth Amendment

295

in other Fourth Amendment cases. In McDonald, the Court declined
to expressly consider whether the police officers' entry into the locked
common areas of the rooming house violated the defendant's right to
privacy.151 Instead, the Court rested its opinion on the absence of a
search warrant, but it failed to state where the search went wrong.152
This approach begs the question of whether government agents vio
lated the defendant's rights by their presence in the hallway. If, as the
government contended, the agents violated only the landlady's Fourth
Amendment rights by entering the locked building,153 and if the hall
way is to be considered a public place from a tenant's perspective,154
then McDonald should have had no standing to raise a constitutional
complaint.
The Fourth Amendment has never required a law enforcement of
ficer to avert his eyes when passing by a home.155 This principle has
been interpreted broadly, so that even when government agents pass
by a home in an unusual manner, so long as there is a public right to
be there, no constitutional complaint will be heard.156 There is no
question that, in this case, the officers in the hallway observed the de
fendant engaged in illegal activity.157 Furthermore, it is well settled
that an officer has the right to arrest a person without a warrant for a
crime committed in his presence.158 If the officers did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by their presence in the hall
way, then their subsequent seizure of the defendant's gambling mate
rials should have been justified under the plain view doctrine,159 as the
151.

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454.

152.

Id. at 457 (Jackson, J., concurring).

153.

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454.

154. See, e.g., United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968).
155. The Court's approach here is clear:
The Fourth Amendment . . . has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact
that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an offi
cer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
156. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that police observation of a
greenhouse from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that police observation of a
backyard from an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy).
157.

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453.

158. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592 (1980); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 440 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 316
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925).
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cash, adding machines, and gambling slips were clearly visible in the
room.160
The language of the opinion also seems to indicate that had the
landlady independently admitted the officers, the defendant would
have had no valid constitutional complaint.161 This conclusion seems
inconsistent with the lack of a warrant as the sole basis for the Court's
opinion; even if the officers had obtained permission, they still would
have failed to obtain a warrant where it was practical for them to do
so. A narrow reading of McDonald is further undermined in light of
the Supreme Court's declaration that "the reasonableness of a search
does not depend upon the practicability of obtaining a search war
rant."162 Taken together, these factors indicate that the holding in
McDonald must be seen as embracing more than a condemnation of
the government's failure to obtain a warrant in this particular case.
Other courts agree that McDonald is broader than a mere con
demnation of the government's failure to get a warrant, but they seek
to limit that case to a condemnation of violent police entry into the
locked common areas of apartment buildings or rooming houses.163 A
distinction on this basis, however, is improper. If government agents
violated McDonald's constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
and security by violently entering the locked common areas, it is un
clear why these same interests would not be violated if the officers en
ter through guile as in Carriger. Likewise, if a tenant relies upon the
privacy and security offered by a locked door, it is hard to imagine
that he will be concerned about whether police officers breach these
interests by blowing a hole in the door or by sneaking through it when
no one is looking. It is the presence of a trespassing government agent
that is of concern here, and not the manner in which the agent came to
be on the premises. This logic is especially clear when one considers
that even the law of criminal trespass and burglary does not require
force or violence; rather all that is required is unlawful entry by any

159. See Horton v Calif ornia, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990) ("[A]n object that comes into
view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing
law may be seized without a warrant . . . . What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that
the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion . . . .") (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
1 60.

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453.

161.

Id. at 454.

1 62. Chime) v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 771 (1969) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950)).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (distinguishing
McDonald from police entry into locked common areas of apartment complexes by claiming
that the basis for the McDonald holding was that the police officers did not enter in a peace
ful manner).

Fourth Amendment

October 2002)

297

means.164 Consequently, the argument for drawing a constitutional dis
tinction based upon whether the government agents breached a locked
door through violence or through guile should be rejected.
It is no answer to respond that the law already draws a distinction
based on a government agent's manner of entry. While it is well set
tled that no Fourth Amendment interest is implicated if police officers
are admitted to the common areas at the invitation of the landlord or
another tenant,165 the issue of illegal police entry is quite different.
This distinction is justified both in terms of a tenant's subjective expec
tation of privacy and the reasonableness of that expectation.166 A ten
ant must expect that other tenants or the landlord can and will admit
other people into the common areas of his apartment building.167 The
same cannot be said for a tenant's expectation that police officers will
break and enter into the common areas of his apartment building.168
With regard to expectations that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable,169 the Supreme Court has stated that persons who share
areas with others "assume the risk" that the others may permit police
officers to look inside.170 This limitation seems eminently reasonable.
On the other hand, society should be prepared to recognize as reason
able a tenant's expectation that government agents are not working
surreptitiously to circumvent their security systems.
B.

The Supreme Court's Commitment to Protecting Privacy Near the
Home

The Supreme Court's commitment to protecting privacy interests
in and around the home calls for an interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment that protects tenants within the locked common areas of
their apartment buildings from unauthorized, warrantless searches.
The Court has, for instance, read the Fourth Amendment to protect
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1 1 , § 829(e) (2001) ("A person 'enters' upon prem
ises when the person introduces any body part or any part of any instrument, by whatever
means, into or upon the premises.").
165. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1 974) ("[Our] cases at least
make it clear that when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of vol
untary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may
show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common
authority over . . . the premises . . . . " ); United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.
2001) (making clear that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where police gain entry to
locked common areas through the invitation of another tenant).
166.
167.
ring).

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
See, e.g.,

(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1 948) (Jackson, J., concur-

168.

Id.

169.

See Katz, 389 U.S.

at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

170. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
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individuals' privacy interests within the curtilage171 of their private
homes.172 In fact, the curtilage has been considered "part of home it
self for Fourth Amendment purposes."173 Consequently, the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals' privacy expectations within the cur
tilage itself. 174 There are, of course, exceptions, so that there is no vio
lation where a police officer comes "upon the land in the same way
that any member of the public could be expected to do, as by taking
the normal route of access along a walkway or driveway or onto a
porch."175 The case is different where an exclusionary fence protects
the curtilage and officers breach this fence to conduct surveillance of
persons entering and leaving a house.176
The Court's curtilage doctrine is helpful in the locked common
area context for three reasons. First, it underscores the Supreme
Court's special commitment to protecting privacy interests in close
proximity to the home. Second, it demonstrates that the Fourth
Amendment's protection of the area surrounding the home is not lim
ited to preventing officers from peering into the home; rather it is
aimed at protecting "the intimate activity associated with the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life."177 Third, it highlights the in
equities of the majority approach. Those who happen to live in private
houses, surrounded by private property that falls within the curtilage
of these houses, enjoy the Fourth Amendment's protection of their
privacy.178 Those who live in multi-unit apartment buildings, on the
other hand, are stripped of their Fourth Amendment rights by virtue
of the style of housing they have chosen, or have been forced, to
171. "Curtilage" is defined as "the land immediately surrounding and associated with
the home," in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), and as " [t]he land or yard
adjoining a house, usu. within an enclosure," in B LACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (deluxe 7th
ed. 1999).
172. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986), the
Supreme Court noted that while the curtilage was within the Fourth Amendment's protec
tion, all government observation of that art;a is not necessarily barred by the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfa res." Id. In this case, observation from an airplane was likened to passing
by a home on a public thoroughfare. Id.
173. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 1 80 ("Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protec
tion to the curtilage.").
174. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 3.2(c) (pointing out that even "entry of [a
hallway in the interior of a single family dwelling] is a search"). The resulting syllogism is
straightforward: The curtilage is considered part of the home. Entry into a part of the home
constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Therefo re, entry into the curti
lage is also a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
175. Id.
176.

See, e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1981).

177.

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

178.

Id.
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adopt.179 That is, government agents may not, without a warrant, enter
the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"180 if
that home is a single-unit residence, but the majority of circuits permit
them to enter the area "immediately surrounding and associated with
the home" if that home is located within a locked apartment build
ing .181
The reasoning of one of the Court's latest significant Fourth
Amendment cases, Kyllo v. United States,182 also carries great weight
here. At issue in this case was whether governmental use of a thermal
imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat within a private
home amounted to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.183
The Court held that the use of such a device without a warrant vio
lated the Fourth Amendment and refused to allow government tech
nology to intrude upon citizens' privacy interests.184 This holding "as
sure[d) preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" and interposed a
neutral and detached magistrate between citizens and the desires of
the police.185
Although the Court framed its holding as imposing limitations on
governmental use of technology that is not in common public use,186
the Kyllo opinion must be seen as embracing more. The Court took
"the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
forward,"187 stepping in to eliminate a significant threat to the privacy
of the home posed by advancing technology. In the majority of circuits
that have addressed the locked common area question, this privacy in
terest is threatened to an even greater extent by another feature of

179. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
"the common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual ten
ant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors").
180.

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.

181.

See, e.g., Holland, 755 F.2d at 255.

182. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
183. Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 29 (holding that "the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home consti
tutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). In this case, government
agents, suspicious that marijuana was being grown in the defendant's home, used a thermal
imaging device to scan the home to determine whether the heat emanating from the home
was consistent with the use of high intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana indoors.
Id. at 29. On the basis of this scan, the agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant's
home, and, upon executing this warrant, they found over 100 marijuana plants. Id. at 30. The
defendant moved to suppress this evidence, claiming that the agents violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they scanned his home. Id.
184.

Id. at 40.

185.

Id. at 34.

186.

Id. at 40.

187.

Id.
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American society - large, multi-unit apartment complexes subject to
discretionary searches by police officers. In these types of cases, gov
ernment officers do not just passively scan residences from a public
street; instead, they physically trespass188 within private, limited-access
buildings in hopes of finding contraband or other evidence of wrong
doing.189 Tenants must worry, not that an officer is scanning their
homes from across the street,190 but that an officer may be eavesdrop
ping outside their doors or working to circumvent their security sys
tems.191
Taken together, these factors weigh heavily in favor of recognizing
tenants' expectations of privacy within the locked common areas of
their apartment buildings. The privacy and security interests an indi
vidual has in those areas close to the home do not vanish merely be
cause that person lives in an apartment complex.192 Consequently,
courts should make room in their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to protect these interests where tenants have taken precaution to ex
clude unauthorized persons from the common areas of their apart
ment buildings.
Ill. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS
MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT'S HISTORY
AND THE FRAMERS' INTENTIONS

Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in light of the intent of its
Framers and with an eye toward the history surrounding its adoption
demands that the protections embodied within the Amendment be ex
tended to cover the locked common areas of apartment buildings. The
Framers designed the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to safe
guard privacy and limit the discretion of the police,193 but the rule

188. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (noting government
acknowledgment that its officers' actions constituted trespass); United States v. Conti, 361
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (observing that even peaceful entry into locked common areas
constitutes a technical trespass) (citing several cases for this proposition).
189.

See, e.g., United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1989).

190.

See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.

191.

See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976).

192. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1 948) (Jackson, J., concur
ring) (" [E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hall
ways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest
in the integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry.");
State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291 , 294 (La. 1973) ("The fact that the location where the ar
rest took place was a hallway, not an integral part of the apartment which the defendant was
visiting, does not vitiate the defendant's right to reasonably expect privacy from government
intrusion.").
193. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 580, 601 (1999); see also Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for His
tory, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) ("[T]he historical record suggests that objections
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adopted by the majority of circuits is inconsistent with the history of
the Fourth Amendment and the Framers' intent.194
Although there is little agreement about how much weight should
be given to the Framers' intentions, most scholars agree that it should
play at least some role in constitutional interpretation.195 The Supreme
Court has offered some guidance as to the role history and intent are
to play in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, stating that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted. "196
An examination of the Framers' primary concerns underlying their
opposition to general warrants helps to inform this inquiry. The pro
tections embodied in the Fourth Amendment were crafted, in large
part, in response to the Framers' distasteful experience with writs of
assistance,197 a Colonial term for broad and vaguely worded general
warrants authorizing, for example, the search of "suspected places."198
These writs allowed government officials to search any private place at

to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting
privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.").
194. See supra Section I.B (discussing the rule set out by a majority of the circuits that
permits police officers to search locked common areas without a warrant).
195. Davies, supra note 193, at 734. The second Justice Harlan expressed this view well:
Even assuming ambiguity as to the intent of the Framers, it is common sense and not merely
the blessing of the Framers that explains this Court's frequent reminders that: "The interpre
tation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its
provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the
light of its history."
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 123-24 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)); see also, Richard B. Saphire, Constitutional Theory in
Perspective: A Response to Professor Van A lstyne, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1453 n.86 (1984)
(noting that most jurists who dismiss the importance of the Framer's intentions retain "some
conception of the framers' intent plays a role in [their] general approach to constitutional
interpretation"); William A. Aniskovich, Note, In Defense of the Framers' Intent: Civic Vir
tue, the Bill of Rights, and the Frame;-s' Science of Politics, 15 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1312, 1322
(1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on, and deference to, the Framers intent
suggests that intent must play at least some role in interpreting the Bill of Rights). But see
Davies, supra note 193, at 747 ("The reality of deep change since the framing means that the
original meaning generally cannot directly speak to modern issues.").
196. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
197. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5 1-78 (1937); see also Mark R.
Killenbeck, Legal History: The Qualities of Completeness: More? or Less?, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1629, 1637 (1999) (reviewing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,
DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS {Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997)) ("The Court has stressed, for
example, that ' [t)he writs of assistance . . . were the principle grievaqce against which the
fourth amendment was directed.' ").
198. Davies, supra note 193, at 558, 561 (noting that "general warrants" also referred to
warrants issued without sworn complaints or to those issued without an adequate showing of
cause).
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will,199 which often resulted in the "abhorred practice of breaking in,
ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing peo
ple's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates."200
Opponents vigorously protested these writs as illegal,201 and de
nounced them as "the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most de
structive of English liberty, that ever was found in an English law
book,"202 because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer."203 The colonists did not react well to this en
croachment on their liberty, and protests, riots, and refusals to comply
with the writs followed with regularity.204 The reaction against these
writs of assistance was so strong, and the opposition to them so great,
that the Framers found it necessary to outlaw them by direct constitu
tional prohibition.205
A constitutional ban on general warrants is not unique to the
United States Constitution. Rather, the Fourth Amendment's prohibi
tions, like most of the first eight amendments, were recasts of provi
sions already existing within state constitutions.206 One such example
was the Pennsylvania Constitution, whose search and seizure provision
was itself a restatement of the common law, prudently inscribed in the
supreme legal document of the state as "a solemn veto against this
powerful engine of despotism."207 The Framers acted similarly on the
national level, entering a solemn veto against unreasonable searches
and seizures in the United States Constitution.208 Their decision to
place this veto in the Constitution is significant because the notion of a
constitution is colored with systemic presumptions of permanence and
continuity.209
199. LASSON, supra note 197, at 53.
200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
201 . LASSON, supra note 197, at 58-59; see also Davies, supra note 193, at 588 ("[A] general warrant was clearly deemed illegal by the framing era . . . . ").
202. LASSON, supra note 197, at 59 (quoting James Otis).
203.

Id. at 60.

204.

Id. at 65-77.

205. See Davies, supra note 193, at 609-11, 613; Killenbeck,
(quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1988)).

supra

note 197, at 1637

206. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Davies,
note 193, at 693 ("The historical record of the framing of the Fourth Amendment
shows that it was essentially a replay of the framing of the state provisions.").

supra

207. Davies, supra note 193, at 613:
The whole [search and seizure provision] was nothing more than an affirmance of the com
mon law, for general warrants have been decided to be illegal; but as the practice of issuing
them had been ancient, the abuses great, and the decisions against them only of modem
date . . . it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto against this powerful engine of des
potism. (quoting Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318 (Pa. 1814)).
208.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

209. Davies, supra note 193, at 734.
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The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is inconsistent with
this veto and flies in the face of one of the major concerns motivating
the Framers to ban general warrants - the desire to protect the sanc
tity of homes and secure them against government search.210 The pro
hibition on search and seizure was an affirmation of the common
law211 and must be viewed in light. of the special status accorded to the
home at common law.212 The Supreme Court recognizes this fact213 and
holds that privacy expectations are at their highest in those areas close
to private homes.214 The lo�ked common areas of an apartment build
ing are immediately adjacent to private homes and are unavailable to
the general public. As such, tenants' privacy expectations within these
areas merit recognition as legitimate interests that deserve a high level
of constitutional protection.215
It is important to note that the argument for recognizing constitu
tionally protected privacy interests within locked common areas does
not depend upon viewing common hallways as part of tenants'
homes.216 Rather, it depends upon a consideration of the privacy inter
ests the Framers sought to protect, viewed in the context of modem
living conditions and in light of the privacy interests of tenants in those
areas in close proximity to their homes. The Massachusetts' Court of
Appeals considered the scope of a person's right to privacy and secu
rity in those areas surrounding the home and concluded that there is
no reason why those rights should not apply in the common hallways

210. Id. at 601; Ooud, supra note 193, at 1726.
211. See supra notes 206-207.
212. See Davies, supra note 193, at 603 (stating that at common law the house had a
unique status and was a sacrosanct interest tied to the entitlement to be left alone).
213. In the oft-quoted words of William Pitt:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may
enter; but the King of England cannot enter - all his force dares not cross the threshold of
the ruined tenement!
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham)
(noting the importance of the home at common law).
214. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (declining
to recognize a privacy interest in an industrial area in part because "this is not an area im
mediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened");
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that privacy expectations are most
heightened in those areas intimately linked to the home).
215. See, e.g., State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) (recognizing a tenant's
Fourth Amendment "right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion" within
the hallways of his apartment building); Commonwealth v. Goldoff, 510 N.E.2d 277, 280
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
216. But cf. United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
tenants have no legitimate privacy interest in locked common areas of apartment buildings
because the Supreme Court has not given the status of "home" to common areas).
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of apartment buildings that tenants "have collectively secured from
the general public by a locked door."217
Indeed, it is difficult to come up with a good reason for depriving
tenants of their privacy and security interests. Tenants in a multi-unit
apartment building have an expectation of security and privacy from
trespassers,218 and to contend otherwise is to ignore the reality of a
locked door guarding the common areas. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has recognized apartments as "homes" for Fourth Amendment
purposes,219 and the locked common areas of apartment buildings, re
gardless of their quality or location, are not public thoroughfares.220
They are, instead, private property reasonably secured against the en
try of unauthorized individuals. The Framers would, no doubt, have
been shocked at the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment permits
police officers to trespass into the locked entryway of a private, single
family house,221 and yet a majority of the circuits hold that similar po
lice action loses all significance as soon as another family or tenant is

217. In Go/doff, the issue before the court was whether an assault that occurred within
the common hallway of the victim's apartment building took place within his "dwelling
house." Go/doff, 510 N.E.2d at 278. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the pur
pose of burglary statutes was "to prohibit that conduct which violates a person's right of se
curity in a place universally associated with refuge and safety, the dwelling house." Id. at
280. The court stated:
When this historical [common law] right to security in one's place of habitation is considered
in the context of contemporary multi-unit residential structures, we can think of no reason
why that right should not apply to tenants who reach their apartment units by a common
hallway which they have collectively secured from the general public by a Jocked door . . . .
This reasoning applies with equal or greater force when the common areas of an apartment
building (or condominium complex) are concerned.

Id.

(internal citations and quotations omitted). While the holding in Go/doff pertained to a
state burglary statute, the court's reasoning as to a tenant's privacy and security interests
within the locked common areas of an apartment building is strongly probative here.
218. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
While this expectation is not absolute, it is still of significant value. See infra notes 233-238
and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810-13 (1984) (considering the de
fendant's apartment to be his home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
220. Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)
("The hallways of residential buildings, whether luxury highrises or humble rooming houses,
are not public streets.").

221. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 625 (1999) (describing protection of the home as
the core of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed."); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914)
("[T]he Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property
against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law acting under leg
islative or judicial sanction."); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 3.2(c) (pointing out
that "entry of [a hallway in the interior of a single family dwelling] is a search").
.
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involved.222 The respect due the home and the area surrounding it de
mands more protection than this.
The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is also at odds with
another major factor motivating a constitutional ban on general war
rants - the Framers' hostility to conferring discretionary search
authority on common police officers.223 The Framers were concerned
about the use of general warrants, especially as used and abused by
customs officials.224 Consequently, they sought to interpose a neutral
magistrate between the zealous police officer and the citizen to ensure
that the citizen's privacy was disturbed only when the police officer's
suspicions were supported by probable cause.225 They did so because
"[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the dis
cretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police
acting on their own cannot be trusted. "226 The Supreme Court recog
nizes this fact and has been firm in maintaining that the Fourth
Amendment is more than a mere formality and that the presence of a
search warrant in the hands of the police serves an important pur
pose.227 Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have dismissed this high
function where locked apartment buildings are concerned and have
vested warrantless officers with discretionary authority to search the
locked common areas of apartment complexes at will.228 The Supreme
Court should reject this narrow interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and, in its place, adopt a construction that is consistent
with the aims of the Framers and the history of the Amendment.

IV.

SOUND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LOCKED COMMON AREA

CONTEXT
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover the
locked common areas of apartment buildings is also desirable as a
matter of public policy. A broad interpretation is needed to protect
tenants' legitimate privacy interests and is necessitated by a respect for

222. See, e.g., United States v. Mccaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170,
1172 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985).
223. Davies, supra note 193, at 580, 583 (noting a "historical condemnation[] of officers
exercising discretionary authority").
224. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669-71 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (discussing the Framer's concerns).
225. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (discussing the motivations behind the Fourth Amendment).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra Section J.B.
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the rule of law. Furthermore, broad protections provide a workable
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the inter
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment.229 Justice Harlan urged the
Court not to "merely recite . . . risks without examining the desirability
of saddling them upon society . . . without at least the protection of a
warrant requirement."230 Taking this counsel into consideration, it is
undesirable for government officers, governed by nothing but their
own discretion, to enter locked common areas through trickery, tres
pass, or other disingenuous means, to peer down hallways, peek under
doors, and eavesdrop outside tenants' apartments.
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the locked
common areas of apartment buildings is needed to protect the legiti
mate privacy interests of tenants in multi-unit apartment buildings.
Many courts disagree with this assertion, however, finding the idea of
a reasonable expectation of privacy within the common areas of a
building to be counterintuitive.231 From this perspective, " [a]n expecta
tion of privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free
of any intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."232 As no single
tenant has an absolute right to exclude others from the common areas,
these courts see little reason for drawing artificial lines that only serve
to keep police officers out.
Courts should not, however, immediately dismiss tenants' privacy
interests because they are not absolute.233 In fact, arguing that locked
common areas, open to use by other tenants and their guests, offer no
real shield. of privacy or protection ignores reality.234 The facts of the
cases cited in this Note reveal that tenants do, in fact, rely on the pri
vacy and security of locked common doors and, consequently, are apt
to leave their doors ajar,235 to deposit various private items in desig229. It is also arguable that this construction of the Fourth Amendment is needed to
ensure that both rich and poor are equally protected by the Amendment. Poor tenants, es
pecially minorities, are much more likely to Jive in neighborhoods subject to close police
scrutiny and are, therefore, more likely to feel the sting of unbridled police discretion. See
David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 678 (1994).
230. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is
odd to think of an expectation of 'privacy' in the entrances to a building.").
232. United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977).
233. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways
those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the
integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry."); see also
supra notes 102-122 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816 ("The locks on the doors to the entrances of the
apartment complex were to provide security to the occupants, not privacy in common hall
ways.").
235. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1976).
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nated storage areas,236 or to leave items stored at the end of hallways
or stairwells.237 Courts should recognize that many Americans do not
live in single-family homes238 and should interpret the Constitution to
protect these individuals' privacy interests against uninvited or unwar
ranted intrusions.
In addition to a concern for protecting tenants' legitimate expecta
tions of privacy, a due respect for the rule of law demands that the
Court recognize tenants' privacy interests within the locked common
areas of their apartment buildings. Since the inception of this nation,
Americans have taken pride in the fact that the American system of
government embodies the rule of law, and not of men.239 This principle
is jeopardized, however, when courts conclude that, in the interest of
efficient law enforcement, police officers may violate the law to secure
arrests and convictions.240 In fact, Justice Brandeis cautioned that the
very existence of ordered government is endangered when the gov
ernment fails to adhere faithfully to its own laws.241 He further warned
that when "the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in
vites anarchy."242
For too long, courts have, in the name of safety and efficiency,
permitted police officers to enter and search the locked common areas
of apartment complexes without the protection of a warrant. They
reason that permitting police to conduct discretionary searches of
locked common areas strikes the optimal balance, for it gives tenants
beneficial police protection within these areas, while at the same time
preserving the privacy of their actual homes, that is, their apart-

236. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998).
237. See, e.g., United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1999).
238. See, e.g., Judy Stark, Old Favorite, New Location, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 7,
2002, at lF ("One-third of all Americans rent their housing, and 15 percent of all households
Jive in apartments, the National Multi Housing Council says.").
239. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 {1803) ("The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.").
240. See supra notes 54, 188 (noting that even courts that uphold warrantless searches of
locked common areas acknowledge that the police officers' actions are illegal).
241. In Justice Brandeis's words:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, exis
tence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe tile law scrupulously. Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
242. Id. ("To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the convic
tion of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution.").
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ments.243 It is indeed laudable that courts have stopped short of strip
ping tenants of all their privacy interests, but this rationale alone can
not be seen as a justification for stripping tenants of their privacy and
security interests within the locked common areas of their apartment
buildings.244 It is no answer to a constitutional complaint to respond
that a particular government action results in greater police protection
for society. Justice Douglas warned that this kind of compromise is
detrimental to the privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment and stated that a strict construction of the Fourth
Amendment is needed to protect citizens from the onslaught of a
government concerned predominately with efficiency and order.245 A
meaningful application of the Fourth Amendment reveals that tenants
do have an expectation of privacy that society should recognize as
reasonable.246 The Supreme Court should heed Justice Douglas'
warning and remain vigilant in jealously protecting citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.
Finally, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants'
privacy interests is compatible with the Supreme Court's concern with
providing "a workable accommodation between the needs of law en
forcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."247
Extending the scope of the Fourth Amendment to cover the locked
common hallways of an apartment complex is not unduly restrictive
because officers remain free to enter and search the locked common
areas of apartment complexes with authorization from a tenant, land
lord, or magistrate.248 Requiring police officers to obtain permission

243. United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985).
244. In any question of constitutional interpretation in light of countervailing social in
terests, it is essential to remember that "grave threats to liberty often come in times of ur
gency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.'' Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. In Justice Douglas's words:
[T]he concepts of privacy . . . enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when
we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them
from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to
carry on. That is why a 'strict construction' of the Fourth Amendment is necessary if every
man's liberty and privacy are to be constitutionally honored.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
246. See, e.g., McDonald v United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1948) (Jackson, J., con
curring); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 549-52 (6th Cir. 1976); see also supra Parts
II, III.

247. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
248. Some assert that the warrant requirement serves little purpose because judges usu
ally just rubber stamp search warrant applications. See, e.g. , David B. Kopel & Paul H.
Blackman, The Unwarranted Warrant: The Waco Search Warrant and the Decline of the
Fourth Amendment, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 42 (1996) (internal citations omit-
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before passing through a locked door cannot be seen as any more un
reasonable than the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
itself. Law enforcement needs are adequately served because police
remain unaffected in "hot pursuit" cases249 and in other exigent cir
cumstances.250
This rule is preferable to that adopted by a majority of the circuits
because it lays down a clearly defined boundary line while at the same
time protecting tenants' privacy interests. While other circuits boast
that their rule is desirable because it is easy for officers to understand
and apply,251 it is unclear why a more protective rule would not be just
as easy for police officers to comprehend. In fact, the rule to the con
trary is quite simple. If a door is locked, a police officer must obtain
permission or a warrant before he or she goes inside. Any officer in
the field can comprehend this rule,252 and its application would impede
law enforcement efforts only where those efforts unreasonably inter
fered with constitutionally protected interests.
In short, society should not, as a matter of constitutional law and
public policy, declare that tenants who choose to live in multi-unit
apartment complexes, with the inherent loss of privacy that results
from a mutual toleration of other tenants and their guests, conse
quently forfeit all legitimate claims to privacy in these common areas.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are stronger than that,253
and the Court ought not allow the constitutional protections that safe
guard an individual's privacy and security to be overcome so easily.254

ted). The Supreme Court, however, has pointed out that the presence of a search warrant in
the hands of the police serves an important purpose. See McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
police officers' entry into the locked common areas of an apartment building without a war
rant, permission or exigency violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
251. See, for example, United States v. Holland:
This rule . . . lays down a clearly-defined boundary line for constitutionally permissible po
lice action, which is readily apparent to an officer in the field, without a need for counting
apartments, analyzing common-hallway traffic patterns or interpreting the mental processes
of a suspect relating to an area used in common with others.
755 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
252 Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."). If police officers can understand this
rule, there is no reason why they cannot understand the rule advocated for in this Note.
253. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").
254. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
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CONCLUSION

This Note examines the various approaches taken by circuit courts
in determining whether a tenant has a constitutionally protected pri
vacy interest within the locked common areas of an apartment build
ing and demonstrates that the resolution of this issue by the majority
of circuits is unsatisfactory. It argues that while states undoubtedly
have a legitimate interest in preserving order and ensuring safety
within the locked common areas of apartment buildings, courts should
not permit the government to accomplish these obj ectives by running
roughshod over the Fourth Amendment.
This Note argues for a resolution of the deep circuit split in this
area through the adoption of broad constitutional protections. It ar
gues that Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Fourth
Amendment, the intent of the Framers, and considerations of sound
public policy all necessitate the recognition of a constitutionally pro
tected privacy interest within the locked common areas of an apart
ment building. Finally, this Note argues that the manner of resolution
advocated herein is superior to the approach taken by the majority of
the circuits because it lays down clearly defined boundary lines to
guide police behavior, while at the same time protecting tenants'
legitimate privacy interests.

